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And of course the rules to be administered through the GATT/WTO dispute
settlement system are far from perfect, but reflect a series of compromises, trade-
offs and bargains that often make it difficult to detect the principle behind a given
rule. Still, the system here described looks promising, sufficiently promising to
justify the decisions of the United States and other countries in the final frantic
days of the Uruguay Round to yield on matters on which they had said they would
never yield-grain exports, rice imports, taxes on movies, textile quotas or
whatever.
I have never believed that a right without a remedy is no right at all. But there
can be no doubt that the closer a legal system comes to affording remedies for
breaches of rules, the stronger are the rights it confers, and the more reliance can
be placed on the rules. The Understanding on Dispute Settlement and creation of
the WTO are as yet untested, but they appear to be major steps in the right
direction.
ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD
THE FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
After fifteen years of continuous, intense and difficult negotiations among the
nations of the world, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was
adopted in 1982.1 The overwhelming majority of states signed it and over sixty
have ratified it.2 It will enter into force on November 16, 1994.
Now the world must decide whether or not the Convention will be widely
ratified, that is, whether objections to Part XI will be accommodated and the
Convention will enjoy both widespread and representative participation. This op-
tion will not last indefinitely.
In recent years, the laws and policies of many governments have been based on
the assumption that in time the Convention would be widely ratified. Its entry into
force puts that assumption to the test. If over time the assumption appears to be
increasingly questionable, its influence as a restraining force on the laws and
actions of governments may weaken. As states yield to the temptation to adopt
measures inconsistent with the Convention, their willingness and political ability
to ratify it will decline, and we will have lost a unique opportunity to reap its
benefits.
The most significant impediments to ratification of the Convention by indus-
trial states are legitimate objections to the deep seabed mining regime set forth in
Part XI and related annexes. Serious negotiations to overcome those objections
are now bearing fruit. New texts have been drafted that streamline and reduce the
cost of the regime and institutions, increase the influence of industrial states over
decisions, and replace controversial provisions, such as those dealing with finan-
' United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, UN Doc.
A/CONF.62/122 (1982), reprinted in UNrrED NATIONS, OFFIcIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH ANNEXES AND INDEX, UN Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1983)
[hereinafter LOS Convention].
2 Most of the first 60 states to ratify are in Africa, Asia and Latin America, including large countries
such as Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia and Mexico.
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cial obligations, production limitations and transfer of technology, with market-
oriented approaches. Recognizing that widespread ratification of the Convention
would be encouraged by avoiding implementation of the objectionable provisions
of Part XI when the Convention enters into force, the new texts facilitate the early
implementation of the modified system and allow provisional participation for
several years. The success of this effort is undoubtedly crucial to the fate of the
Convention.
The political controversy over deep seabed mining has long captured the imagi-
nation of people who otherwise may have little interest in the oceans or the law of
the sea, or international law for that matter. This has obscured a basic underlying
fact. The Law of the Sea Convention deals with a large number of other issues of
substantial importance to existing and reasonably foreseeable economic, environ-
mental and security interests of states.
Misperceptions persist notwithstanding consistent efforts to set the record
straight.3 The need to deal with these misperceptions, at a time when the future of
the Convention hangs in the balance, inspires the authors to state views regarding
its significance that are informed by their participation in its negotiation and
related matters.4 Policy, not originality, is the object.
One sometimes wonders whether many of its critics have read the Convention.
Some interested in economics and political economy opine about the acceptability
of the Convention as if deep seabed mining were its sole object, and the ideology
of the deep seabed mining regime an overriding priority. Elaborate theories about
the conduct and utility of multilateral negotiations are derived from the failure of
Part XI to bridge alternative perceptions in a generally acceptable manner. Many
critics utter nary a word about important interests in energy, food, trade and
communications, the environment or other matters successfully dealt with by the
Convention.
Attempts to treat the Convention as a partisan issue in the United States ignore
not only the facts about the Convention but its negotiating history as well. United
States policy for a new convention on the law of the sea was first determined by
President Nixon, taking into account a study commissioned by Congress, and was
maintained in its essentials thereafter. Specific negotiating positions evolved in
the course of the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations in response to the views
of other countries, as well as interested members of Congress, congressional staff
s Notable among these efforts is the work of the Panel on the Law of Ocean Uses, chaired by
Professor Louis Henkin, whose papers include United States Interests in the Law of the Sea Convention,
88 AJIL 167 (1994); U.S. Interests and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 21 OcEAN
DEv. & INT'L L. 373 (1990); Deep Seabed Mining and the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, 82
AJIL 363 (1988); U.S. Policy on the Settlement of Disputes in the Law of the Sea, 81 AJIL 438 (1987);
and Exchange Between Expert Panel and Reagan Administration Officials on Non-Seabed-Mining
Provisions of LOS Treaty, 79 AJIL 151 (1985). Individual panel members and others have also written
extensively on the issues involved.
4John R. Stevenson was Legal Adviser of the U.S. Department of State from 1969 to 1972 and
Ambassador and Special Representative of the President to the Third UN Conference on the Law of
the Sea from 1973 to 1975. He has served as President and Honorary President of The American
Society of International Law, and as a partner, and later Chairman and Senior Partner, of Sullivan &
Cromwell. Bernard H. Oxman served as attorney-adviser and Assistant Legal Adviser of the U.S.
Department of State from 1969 to 1977, was a member and later vice chairman of the U.S. delegation
throughout the negotiation of the Law of the Sea Convention from 1969 to 1982, chaired the English
Language Group of the Conference Drafting Committee, and now directs the Ocean and Coastal Law
Program of the University of Miami School of Law.
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and the public. The Bush and Clinton administrations continued President Rea-
gan's policy of respecting the Convention while maintaining objections to Part XI.
Serious international efforts to find means to deal with the objections of industri-
alized states to Part XI were initiated by the UN Secretary-General during the
Bush administration. Ill-informed attempts to portray interest in a successful Con-
vention as some sort of left-wing conspiracy are also belied by the fact that most
leaders of the U.S. delegation to the Law of the Sea Conference were Repub-
licans.
Apart from a relatively narrow community of experts, few observers seem aware
that President Reagan, while rejecting the deep seabed mining regime, embraced
the remainder of the Convention dealing with traditional law of the sea issues and
declared it to be the basis of United States policy.5 Indeed, careful scrutiny of his
statements suggests that he was prepared to use force if necessary to defend
certain rights guaranteed by a Convention that some of his supporters dismissed
as utterly without virtue.
Even pragmatic business leaders could be misled by the misperception that the
Convention is principally about deep seabed mining. Far more significant are
substantive and dispute settlement provisions of the Convention that enhance the
stability of expectations in the business of transporting oil and gas by sea, as well
as extracting oil and gas from the continental shelf. The Convention is also impor-
tant to the stability of expectations of investment bankers, insurance companies
and others who underwrite and support shipping, offshore exploration and drill-
ing, fishing and many other activities at sea. It would be a disservice to their
stockholders for such businesses to formulate their views on ratification of the
Convention on the basis of essentially speculative investments in consortia to
recover deep seabed manganese nodules.
The same may be said of the duties of environmental leaders to their constitu-
ents. Some may have been misled into believing that this is a treaty about deep
seabed mining that incidentally deals with some arcane issues of pollution from
ships. Too few step back to observe that this is a strong, innovative and compre-
hensive global environmental treaty governing over two-thirds of the planet. With
their support, it could be accepted as a binding treaty by the overwhelming major-
ity of states. If ever there was an opportunity to demonstrate that environmental
consciousness has fundamentally transformed international law, this is it.
The Convention lays down basic rules for the governance and protection of all
of the sea, including the airspace above and the seabed and subsoil below. The
deep seabeds are likely to remain the least used area addressed by the Convention.
As defined in the Convention, the international seabed area (commonly referred
to as the "deep seabeds") comprises that part of the seabed and subsoil that
remains after formidable coastal appetites were satisfied by subjecting the re-
sources of a 200-mile zone and the continental margin to coastal state jurisdic-
tion. In particular, coastal states were able to ensure that virtually all geological
structures associated with significant deposits of oil and gas are likely to be found
within coastal state jurisdiction, not in the international seabed area.
Deep seabed mining has yet to occur. While promising sites have been identi-
fied by various companies that understandably wish to protect their investments,
demand for the metals principally responsible for interest in manganese nodules,
' Statement by the President, Mar. 10, 1983, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRzs. Doc. 383 (Mar. 14, 1983),
reprinted in 22 ILM 464 (1983).
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especially nickel and copper, has been depressed in recent years and may be
satisfied for some time to come by sources on land. These metals can be stock-
piled, and concerns have abated about the climate for remunerative investment
in, and stable supply from, mines located in many countries of the world. In
addition, hard minerals (whether in the form of nodules, polymetallic crusts or
other deposits), geothermal energy and other resources also exist within the vast
economic zones and continental shelves off the coasts of the United States and
other states.
The provisions of the Convention dealing with activities on the deep seabeds
other than mining are helpful. Navigation, telecommunications, scientific re-
search and defense activities are protected. The potential use of the deep seabeds
causing the most immediate and widespread environmental concern, namely dis-
posal of wastes, is addressed within the framework of the Ocean Dumping Con-
vention;6 both existing and future regulations under that treaty are incorporated
by reference and strengthened by the substantive and dispute settlement provi-
sions of the Law of the Sea Convention.
The important point is that the deep seabeds are only one part of the oceans
and that deep seabed mining is only one interest addressed by the Convention. On
the assumption that important objections to Part XI will be overcome by new
texts, it is crucial to direct attention to the many other aspects of the Convention
that have all too often been ignored or taken for granted, and to identify those
benefits that are unlikely to be available at all, or to the same degree, in the
absence of widespread ratification.
STABILITY AND ORDERED CHANGE
In most cases, the object of the Convention is to establish an agreed allocation
of jurisdiction and concomitant duties among states, rather than to regulate activi-
ties as such. The rights and obligations of individuals and companies with respect
to each other and to the public at large are the end products of the lawful exercise
(or delegation) of jurisdiction by the appropriate state. Doubt or controversy
about which activities are subject to the jurisdiction of which state impedes the
elaboration and enforcement of national as well as international rules and stand-
ards governing specific uses of the sea. No right or duty is secure if it rests on an
uncertain or contested jurisdictional foundation.
The history of the law of the sea in this century reveals a tendency to assume
that a coastal state will benefit by unilaterally extending the monopoly control it
enjoys on land to activities off its coast, without considering whether unilateral
claims asserted by other states and instability in the law would be consistent with
its interests. The Truman Proclamation stimulated (or at least was relied upon to
justify) a cascade of claims by coastal states over the high seas that vastly exceeded
the rights over the continental shelf claimed by the United States. The first two
conferences on the law of the sea in 1958 and 1960 attempted to restore the
stability of expectations that law should provide. Despite important accomplish-
ments, however, no lasting accommodation was reached between the interests of
states in controlling foreign activities off their own coasts and the interests of
states in protecting the freedom to conduct activities off foreign coasts without
interference.
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Dec.
29, 1972, 26 UST 2403, 1046 UNTS 120.
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History taught that war and conquest followed upon attempts to interfere with
shipping or naval routes deemed vital by another state with the means to respond.
Yet the trend toward claims that purported to expand coastal state control over
navigation and overflight accelerated. That trend was manifested in expanding
territorial sea claims, restrictive interpretations of the right of innocent passage
within the territorial sea, and coastal state assertions of the right to impose unilat-
eral restrictions on navigation beyond the territorial sea.
As a maritime power and trading nation with interests and responsibilities
around the world, the United States would inevitably be sensitive to these prob-
lems. The cost of bilateral purchase of potentially important navigation rights in
all the corners of the globe that U.S. trade or U.S. forces might wish to pass would
be prohibitive.' A situation was developing in which the United States would have
to divert increasing resources, including naval and air forces, to confront foreign
claims in order to protect the right to use areas of operational interest and to
prevent the accumulation of adverse precedent; at the same time, the platform of
principle for such resistance was collapsing as a result of accelerating foreign
claims, as well as support for new coastal claims in Congress.
Similar problems confronted other states, including developing countries with
limited means to protect the routes linking them to their friends and trading
partners, and with less ability to absorb increased costs. Sophisticated observers
recognized that nearly every coastal state needed an authoritative basis for recon-
ciling its own long-term coastal and maritime interests and to maintain the integ-
rity of that balance in the face of inevitable pressures to change it unilaterally. The
goal was a stable accommodation of coastal and maritime interests both within
.and between coastal states that would be respected by each state's classe politique
as a continuing restraint upon its jurisdictional choices.
There are four main reasons why a widely ratified Convention is a better guar-
antor of this long-term stability than customary international law.
First, governments are more inclined to respect obligations to which formal
consent has been given by the highest political authorities. Even if the Convention
is now generally declaratory of customary international law, this leaves much
room for argument about important details.
Second, without widespread ratification, inevitable "violations" are more easily
interpreted as evidence that state practice, the ultimate source of customary law,
is not necessarily rooted in the Convention.
Third, the Convention contains compulsory dispute settlement procedures to
help restrain unreasonable claims and contribute to a stable legal order. Custom-
ary international law imposes no such obligation and few states are under such an
obligation to each other.
Fourth, the Convention contains a system for ordered change that strengthens
rather than erodes the legitimacy of its basic structure. It is open to formal
amendment and encourages supplementary agreements and organizational ar-
rangements with the participation of affected states. Its interpretation will be
adapted to changing circumstances by authoritative tribunals. It incorporates by
reference future safety and environmental rules, and contains a flexible system of
shared competence for regulating navigation in particularly sensitive or danger-
ous coastal areas.
7 A reciprocal grant of similar rights off the United States coast would rarely be regarded as ade-
quate "consideration" in such arrangements. Geography alone determines that few foreign states
need to navigate past the U.S. coast to reach destinations outside the United States.
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The traditional method for adapting the customary international law of the sea
to new circumstances and special problems has been unilateral claims ofjurisdic-
tion by the coastal state, the very source of instability in the law of the sea in
the past.
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, TRADE AND COMMUNICATIONS
Since the dawn of history, the sea has served humanity as a primary avenue of
communication, whether by ship, aircraft or cable.
From the perspective of international security, the basic question is whether
forces may be moved from one place to another without the consent or interfer-
ence of states past whose coasts they proceed. Global mobility is important not
only to naval powers but to other states that rely on those powers to maintain
stability and deter aggression, directly or through the United Nations. As the size
of major navies is reduced after the Cold War, the adverse impact on their ability
to perform their primary missions will increase if they must divert scarce re-
sources to challenging coastal state claims that prejudice global lines of communi-
cation or set adverse precedents. Enhancing the legal security of navigation and
defense activities at sea maximizes the efficient use of defense resources.
From the perspective of trade and communications, the basic question is
whether two states may communicate with each other by sea without interference
by a third state past whose coast they proceed. Restrictions imposed by a coastal
state along the route may well result in increased costs for industries dependent
upon trade and communications and for countries whose exports or imports are
affected.
If governments accorded unquestioned priority to interests in international
security, trade and communications, there would be no law of the sea problem
with respect to coastal state claims. In earlier centuries when the freedom of the.
seas reigned supreme, the law of the sea was relatively stable. Decolonization,
technological development and environmental sensitivity altered priorities in the
twentieth century. It- is no longer plausible to insist upon global mobility as the
sole interest informing policies regarding coastal state jurisdiction. One cannot
have a stable law of the sea that protects navigation and communications unless
one finds a way to accommodate coastal state interests in controlling economic
development of vast offshore areas and protecting the coastal environment.
The Convention seeks to reconcile the conflicting pressures with a complex
allocation of rights and duties. It limits the breadth of the territorial sea to 12
nautical miles, guarantees free transit for all ships and aircraft through straits
overlapped by the territorial sea and through archipelagos, and preserves free-
dom of navigation, overflight, laying of cables and pipelines, and related uses
seaward of the territorial sea. At the same time, it gives the coastal state jurisdic-
tion over living and nonliving resources, drilling, marine scientific research, and
most installations and structures in an exclusive economic zone extending up to
200 miles from the coast and, on the seabed, beyond 200 miles to the outer edge
of the continental margin.' It establishes detailed coastal state rights and duties to
adopt and enforce antipollution standards in these areas.
The Convention offers three protections from the risk that this system will
gradually evolve into the functional equivalent of a 200-mile territorial sea under
-It also doubles, to 24 miles from the coast, the breadth of the contiguous zone in which smuggling
and immigration laws may be enforced.
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discretionary coastal state control, effectively territorializing all of the major seas
of the world. First, the rights and duties of coastal states and flag states are
carefully enumerated. For example, there are requirements for prompt release on
bond of foreign ships arrested for pollution or fisheries violations, and protec-
tions for their crews. Second, the regulation of navigation is closely tied to rules
adopted or approved by the competent international organization, presumably
the International Maritime Organization. Third, both the coastal state and the
flag state are subject to compulsory arbitration or adjudication with respect to
navigation, overflight and related rights. This includes a rapid system for ordering
the release on bond of ships arrested by the coastal state.
These protections are dependent upon or strengthened by widespread ratifica-
tion of the Convention. Compulsory dispute settlement is especially likely to be
the key to ensuring that the complex balance between coastal state jurisdiction
and the freedoms of navigation and communication is respected and evolves in an
orderly way. It may well be a useful tool for governments in their attempts to
restrain their own political processes. It is also an important option for respond-
ing peacefully, but effectively, to excessive coastal state claims or interpretations.
PROTECTION OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
The advance in international environmental law effected by the Convention is
reflected in the unfettered clarity of the opening article of Part XII: "States have
the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment." 9
The Convention requires states to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction
do not cause environmental damage to other states or result in the spread of
pollution beyond their own offshore zones; to minimize to the fullest possible
extent the release of harmful substances into the marine environment from land-
based sources; to protect rare or fragile ecosystems; to conserve living resources;
and to prevent the introduction of alien species into the marine environment
where they may cause harm. It also provides for environmental impact assess-
ments of planned activities, environmental monitoring of ongoing activities, and
contingency planning for pollution emergencies. States are required to cooperate
in establishing global and regional rules and standards for specific sources of
pollution.
The environmental 'obligations placed on states relate to activities subject to
their jurisdiction. Taken as a whole, the Convention therefore clarifies not only
the nature of the environmental obligations of states, but also the activities and
areas that are the object of those obligations. Four factors are particularly impor-
tant in assessing the significance of this effort to combine the allocation of eco-
nomic and other rights with the assumption of environmental duties.
First, the environmental regime is incorporated into a binding treaty. While a
growing number of global and regional treaties deal with important environmen-
tal matters, none purports to impose comprehensive environmental obligations
on so many activities in so many places. Other comprehensive global environmen-
tal instruments, including those adopted at Stockholm in 1972 and Rio de Janeiro
,in 1992, have been nonbinding declarations. Enthusiasts may rush to pronounce
such instruments declaratory of customary international law, but even they pre-
sumably understand that this is not the same thing as an international commit-
' LOS Convention, Art. 192. Experienced international negotiators are well aware of the difficulty
of aclhieving agreement to articulate an environmental norm in such direct and unqualified form.
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ment accepted as binding by the highest political organs of a state, including its
parliament, especially when it comes to making the hard political choices neces-
sary to implement environmental standards.
Second, because it contains other incentives for ratification, the Convention
enjoys reasonable prospects of becoming perhaps the most widely ratified environ-
mental treaty. That goal is virtually assured if ratification is forthcoming from
states in which environmental objectives are accorded high priority.
Third, in addition to establishing the basic environmental jurisdiction and du-
ties of states, the Convention obliges the parties to adopt and enforce pollution
control regulations with respect to particular sources, notably ships,1" ocean
dumping, oil drilling and offshore installations. It provides that these regulations
shall at least have the same effect as, or be no less effective than, international
rules and standards that emerge from the work of competent international organi-
zations now and in the future, presumably with widespread and representative
support. This duty applies to all parties to the Convention, whether or not they
are otherwise bound to apply a particular standard.
Lastly, compliance with environmental standards under the Convention is sub-
ject to compulsory arbitration or adjudication. While compromissory clauses are
not unknown in marine pollution treaties, the coupling of compulsory arbitration
and adjudication with environmental obligations under this Convention is an ex-'
traordinary advance over past practice.
Every coastal state shares both the communications and environmental interests
that require harmonization in the allocation of rights and duties to regulate pollu-
tion from ships. Both ships and contaminants move at sea. No coastal state can
protect its environmental interests adequately unless it achieves agreement from
other states to apply restraints to ships under their control. Similarly, no state can
protect its communications interests unless it achieves agreement from many
coastal states regarding the appropriate balance between freedom of navigation
and coastal state competence to interfere with that freedom for environmental
reasons.
The result is one of the most complex efforts at harmonization contained in the
Convention. Specific prescriptive and enforcement powers over foreign ships are
conferred on coastal states by the Convention but are subject to important limita-
tions and safeguards to protect against coastal state excesses. The entire system is
subject to compulsory arbitration or adjudication to help ensure respect for both
environmental duties and navigational rights and to safeguard the stability of this
complex balance."
Naturally enough, there are those who would have liked the Convention to do
more. For example, they might have preferred a more strongly worded duty to
enforce international standards to control land-based sources of marine pollu-
tion. One difficulty was that delegates to a conference on the law of the sea had
" Following the pattern of other marine pollution treaties, the environmental provisions df the
Convention do not apply to warships and other government noncommercial ships and aircraft, but
each state is required to ensure that its excluded vessels and aircraft act in a manner consistent with
those provisions so far as is reasonable and practicable.
" Two significant exceptions to compulsory arbitration or adjudication under the Convention are
"disputes concerning military activities" and disputes "with regard to the exercise by a coastal State of
its sovereign rights or jurisdiction." The latter exception does not apply to coastal state violation of
navigation rights and freedoms or specified environmental rules and standards. LOS Convention, Art.
297, para. 1, Art. 298, para. I(b).
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doubts about their competence to deal with activities on land that might cause
marine pollution. Delegates to the 1992 Rio Conference, who suffered from no
such disability, witnessed the difficulty of getting states to agree to binding rules
affecting significant activities on land. Negotiations are continuing in environmen-
tal forums where specific land-based sources of marine pollution are being
targeted.
The Convention is the strongest comprehensive environmental treaty now in
existence or likely to emerge for quite some time. It is wishful thinking to believe
that the Convention will have as much impact if it is not widely ratified. Nonpar-
ties may be particularly unwilling to regard themselves as bound by the environ-
mental duties outlined in the Convention if governments and organizations ordi-
narily sensitive to environmental issues fail to work for widespread ratification.
The message inherent in such behavior is likely to drown out protests to the
contrary.
COASTAL RESOURCES
The alacrity with which- coastal states "implemented" the sovereign rights elabo-
rated in the Convention with respect to oil and gas, fisheries, and other natural
resources of the economic zone and continental shelf suggests that widespread
ratification of the Convention would not make a significant difference with re-
spect to coastal resources. That is not entirely true, even if one has faith that
coastal state rights are as safely consolidated by customary international law as by
a widely ratified Convention. For example, the economic benefits of exporting
such natural resources may well depend on respect by other states for navigational
rights and for a balanced allocation of competence to control pollution from
ships. Widespread ratification of the Convention is more likely to promote such
respect.
Oil and Gas
One of the reasons coastal state jurisdiction over the continental shelf was
extended to the edge of the continental margin was to incorporate potential
hydrocarbon deposits in the continental rise. Oil and gas development requires
substantial site-specific investments. The Convention protects both the coastal
state and the investor from future disputes about the location of the seaward limit
of coastal state jurisdiction over the continental margin. Limits established by the
coastal state on the basis of the recommendations of an international commission
of experts to which supporting data have been submitted are final and binding on
all parties to the Convention and the International Sea-Bed Authority.
The extension of coastal state jurisdiction over the continental margin, and the
consequent exclusion of the hydrocarbon potential of the continental rise from
the international seabed area, was balanced by the provision for a modest sharing
of revenues from the continental margin beyond 200 miles. 12 This system not only
affords benefits to developing countries (including landlocked countries), but
creates a global interest in the legitimacy and exercise of coastal state jurisdiction
over the continental margin, notwithstanding the disproportionate benefits con-
ferred on certain large and prosperous coastal states.
12 These provisions are what remain of a more ambitious proposal for revenue sharing by President
Nixon in 1970.
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Seaward extension of the limits of the continental shelf and expansion of the
type of installations subject to coastal state jurisdiction also raised doubts about
the rigidity of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf with respect to the
size of safety zones around offshore installations and the requirement that instal-
lations must be entirely removed once they are no longer in use. Those rules were
designed to ensure respect for other uses of the marine environment, both spa-
tially and temporally. If the rules were to be made more flexible, means would
have to be found to ensure that interests in other uses and protection of the
marine environment were adequately reflected (including interests in the safe and
expeditious transport of hydrocarbons by ship). The Convention achieves this by
delegating to the competent international organization, presumably the Interna-
tional Maritime Organization, the authority to establish guidelines for deviating
from the strict requirements regarding safety zones and removal of installations.
Accidents and pollution in one part of the world may increase resistance to oil
and gas development elsewhere. In addition to their environmental interests, both
coastal states and investors have a significant economic interest in assuring that
every coastal state takes adequate measures to protect against pollution from
offshore hydrocarbon development. The Convention accommodates this interest
by providing that all coastal states must at a minimum respect international envi-
ronmental standards established by the competent international organization.
Fisheries
One of the most significant threats to marine life is pollution of the marine
environment. That pollution originates in many ways and in many places. No state
is in a position to solve the problem alone, even off its own coast. Widespread
ratification of the Convention is likely to promote greater protection from pollu-
tion. For that reason alone, those concerned about living resources should sup-
port ratification.
The biological boundaries respected by most stocks of fish in the wild have little
in common with the political boundaries drawn by states. What is required is
consistent management of ecosystems and fish stocks throughout their migratory
range. No general convention can achieve that. But the Convention at least makes
clear that economic zones are not the end of the inquiry, and that sound manage-
ment is required on the basis of biological characteristics. 13
Unless management is coordinated, fishing outside a state's zone can prejudice
both its conservation measures and the economic preferences accorded its fisher-
men within the zone. The 1992 Rio Conference called for international negotia-
tions on the matter, which are now under way. The future of the Convention, and
the stability of the law of the sea, may depend on the willingness of governments
to negotiate constructively in this regard.
General legal rules must be applied to specific regions in any event. In some
regions it may be easier to resolve the problem directly by agreement among the
states concerned with fishing in that area. Such an agreement was recently nego-
13 This includes conservation measures that take into account the interdependence of species, opti-
mum utilization, coordination between neighboring coastal states, special rules for species that mi-
grate between fresh water and the open sea, cooperation in managing highly migratory species, and
agreement with the coastal state on measures to conserve stocks that migrate between the economic
zone and the waters seaward of the zone. Marine mammals are afforded special protection, including
exemption from requirements for optimum utilization.
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tiated with respect to the so-called doughnut hole that is completely surrounded
by the economic zones of Russia and the United States in the Bering Sea.
It should nevertheless be borne in mind that widespread ratification of the
Convention could help. The Convention expressly makes the right to fish beyond
the economic zone subject to the rights, duties and interests of the coastal state
provided for in connection with the economic zone. Fishing beyond the economic
zone is subject to compulsory arbitration or adjudication. Tribunals are em-
powered to prescribe provisional measures "to preserve the respective rights of
the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine environment,
pending the final decision." Should resort to Convention procedures fail to yield
compliance, there is established doctrine regarding the right of a state to respond
to violations of a treaty by another party without challenging the integrity or
binding force of the treaty as such.
This approach should be contrasted with the momentous consequences for the
future of the Convention and the law of the sea if states that have yet to ratify the
Convention were now to make new unilateral claims over the waters beyond the
economic zone. 14 They would bear a heavy burden were they to destroy the prac-
tical opportunity the world now has to accept an agreed framework governing all
the uses of all the oceans.
MARINE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
Many coastal states believe they should have jurisdiction over marine scientific
research wherever they have jurisdiction over exploration and exploitation of
natural resources. Freedom of scientific research is therefore a likely, if not inevi-
table, victim of extensions of coastal state jurisdiction over resources as a result of
either unilateral claims or negotiations. This suggests that, from the perspective of
marine scientific research, widespread ratification of the Convention makes little
difference. That conclusion is not quite correct.
The Convention contains detailed procedures and criteria for obtaining coastal
state consent to conduct scientific research in the economic zone and on the
continental shelf, and provides that coastal states shall, in normal circumstances,
grant their consent unless the research comes within enumerated exceptions. An
"implied consent" rule promotes timely response by coastal states. The Conven-
tion also narrows the grounds for withholding consent for scientific research on
the continental margin seaward of 200 miles where there is no ongoing resource
development activity.
There are a number of other useful provisions. Marine scientific research must
be respected in the course of other activities at sea. The Convention encourages
publication or dissemination of research results. It confirms the right to conduct
scientific research on the high seas beyond the economic zone and in the interna-
tional seabed area, protects that right with compulsory arbitration or adjudica-
tion, and stabilizes the limits of those ,areas.
14 Chile recently declared a "marpresencial" of uncertain content. The effect of Argentine legisla-
tion is also unclear. Canada is under pressure from Newfoundland fishermen to reduce foreign
fishing beyond the economic zone, and Prime Minister Chr~tien alluded to the possibility of a unilat-
eral claim during his election campaign.
EDITORIAL COMMENTS
CONCLUSION
All previous efforts in this century to bring the world together in a stable
agreement on an international regime for the oceans failed. The UN Convention
on the Law of the Sea is the closest we have come. The goal is now within reach.
The Convention was caught in the crossfire of ideological wars that are now
behind us. Remarkably, those wars never really affected more than one part of the
Convention, namely Part XI. That damage is now being repaired by the negotia-
tion of significant changes designed to accommodate objections to the deep
seabed mining regime.
The ideological wars of the past also perpetrated incomplete and ill-informed
perceptions about the Convention that impede rational analysis. The authors are
confident that at least the large majority of those who make the effort to study the
Convention as a whole, and consider the alternatives, will agree that widespread
ratification is important and that the opportunity we now enjoy to achieve that
goal should not be allowed to pass us by.
For those with a sense of history and perspective, the significance of a widely
ratified Convention on the Law of the Sea transcends even the oceans. Since the
time of Grotius, the law of the sea has been a significant part of the fabric of
modern international law. If we can succeed in strengthening the international
law of the sea with a widely ratified Convention, we will strengthen the fabric of
international law generally.
One of the weaknesses of international law is that states have been reluctant to
accept the jurisdiction of courts and arbitrators in principle. At least with respect
to many issues of international law that arise in connection with the oceans, a
widely ratified Convention on the Law of the Sea would remedy that weakness in a
fundamental way. No comparable treaty with such broad mandatory compromis-
sory clauses has ever been widely ratified. Progressive written articulations of the
law by authoritative tribunals are by no means the same thing as self-help rooted
in unilateral perceptions of the potential for forcing acquiescence. And it is the
latter that has often passed for the law of the sea in this century.
A widely ratified Convention, including new texts that accommodate objections
to the deep seabed mining regime, would be a monument to the possibilities of
global multilateral diplomacy. Such a success could be particularly important at a
time when states are beginning to shape a post-Cold War international order. It
would demonstrate that, with time and care, consensus can be achieved on recon-
ciling important security, economic, environmental and other interests; that this
consensus can be expressed in reasonably precise norms and rules that narrow the
issues and limit disputes; and that parliaments can be persuaded to embrace the
result in the common interest.
From the broadest perspective, widespread ratification should be especially
significant for governments that attach particular importance to their capacity to
influence international affairs by their participation in international negotiations
and institutions, and for those of us who prefer a public order in which inclusion
and rational dialogue are the foundations of policy.
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